We present a model of cumulative innovation where …rms can conduct R&D in both a safe and a risky direction to produce quality improvements over the current technology. As patentability standards rise, an innovation in the risky direction is less likely to receive a patent, which decreases the static incentive for new entrants to conduct risky R&D, but increases their dynamic incentive because of the longer duration-and hence higher reward-for incumbency. These, together with a strategic substitution and a market structure e¤ect, result in an inverted-U shape in the risky direction but a U shape in the safe direction for the relationship between R&D intensity and patentability standards. There exists a patentability standard that induces the e¢cient innovation direction, whereas R&D is biased towards (against) the risky direction under lower (higher) standards. The optimal patentability standard generally distorts the R&D direction in order to increase the industry innovation rate.
Introduction
A central issue in the economics of innovation is how patent policy may a¤ect innovative activities. The recent literature has examined this issue in the context of cumulative innovation, where discoveries build on each other, under a standard assumption that …rms pursue innovations along a single research direction. In many industries, however, …rms can conduct R&D in multiple directions to achieve a speci…c goal, as, for example, the development of a next generation color copier in the early 1990s by Fuji Xerox, of a new mobile system by Ericsson in the mid-1990s, and of an X Terminal workstation by the Hewlett Packard in the late 1980s (Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2001 ). 1 The purpose of this paper is to inquire how patent policy, speci…cally patentability standards, may a¤ect the rate and direction of cumulative innovation in an industry where …rms can conduct R&D in multiple directions.
We consider a situation where there are two research directions, A and B, for a sequence of innovations (or new products) that deliver higher product qualities over time. The quality improvement of an innovation in direction B may range stochastically from low to high while that in direction A is at some intermediate level. Hence, if an innovation is patentable only when its quality improvement (or innovation size) is su¢ciently large, as for instance implied by the requirement of a minimum inventive step, there will be a range of quality thresholds, or patentability standards (S); under which innovations in direction A are always patentable but an innovation in direction B may not. We will focus on patentability standards in the interior of such a range, and call A the safe direction while B the risky direction. 2 If innovation is a one-time activity that ends with the successful introduction of a new product, a (marginally) higher patentability standard would discourage R&D in the risky direction by making it harder to obtain a patent and the rents associated with it through 1 In particular, facing the possible emergence of a third-generation mobile system with high bandwidth, Ericsson in the mid-1990s funded research teams to separately develop two di¤erent standards: a more radical new technology called WCDMA and a new standard called EDGE upgrading the existing technologies. 2 That is, we consider patentability standards that are high enough to exceed the left tail of innovations in the risky direction but not so high to make a safe innovation not patentable. We rule out by assumption situations where patentability standards are so high that a safe innovation is not patentable but a risky one can (in which case the problem would be reduced to analyzing innovations only in the risky direction). this direction, which we shall call the threshold e¤ect, whereas it would have no impact on R&D in the safe direction, provided that there are no (dis)economies of scope in R&D and that the return to a successful patentable discovery in one direction is not diminished by that in the other. In this static setting, a higher S reduces industry R&D through the threshold e¤ect, and it also allocates relatively more resources in the safe direction than in the risky direction, which can reduce the expected size of innovation if a successful innovation through the risky direction has a higher expected quality improvement than that through the safe direction.
The issue is more complex if innovations are cumulative, as we assume in this paper.
Speci…cally, we consider the following model that builds on and extends Hunt (2004) by having two research directions: Suppose that n + 1 …rms have entered an industry. At any time, one of them is the leader and the other n …rms are challengers. The challengers are in a patent race to develop a new product that improves upon the current leader's.
When a challenger succeeds in a patentable innovation, it becomes the new leader to replace the current one, who then joins the rank of challengers; and this process repeats itself inde…nitely. In this dynamic setting, a marginal increase in the patentability standard will increase the value of being a leader because it will take longer before the leader is replaced by a successful challenger. This incumbency-prolonging e¤ect can potentially increase the incentive for R&D in both innovation directions, even though the threshold e¤ect from a higher S will still have a negative impact on the incentive for R&D in the risky direction. 3 Moreover, the changes in the R&D incentives in the two di¤erent directions will interact with each other, giving rise to a dynamic strategic substitution e¤ect between the two directions: When the R&D intensity in one direction becomes higher (or lower), it exerts an opposite force on the R&D intensity in the other direction. In particular, an increase of R&D in one direction induces the next innovation discovery to come sooner, which lowers the pro…t from incumbency and thus reduces the incentive for R&D in the other direction.
This turns out to be the crucial force that leads to new e¤ects of patentability standards under multiple research directions.
Finally, as we shall assume, a …rm needs to incur a …xed cost to enter the market in order to conduct R&D and innovate. Therefore, patentability standards, by impacting the expected return to R&D in each direction, also a¤ects the number of entrants in the free entry equilibrium. Our analysis will examine how this market-structure e¤ect interacts with the other forces in the model.
We …nd that as patentability standards rise, R&D intensity in the risky direction …rst rises and then falls, exhibiting an inverted-U shape, whereas R&D intensity in the safe direction is U-shaped, initially decreasing and then increasing. Thus, the incumbencyprolonging e¤ect is the dominating force in the risky direction when S is low, but it is dominated by the negative threshold e¤ect when S is high. More surprising is that despite the positive impact from the incumbency-prolonging e¤ect, increases in S initially lower R&D in the safe direction, due to the strategic substitution e¤ect.
We also …nd that as S increases, the industry rate of innovation initially goes up and eventually falls down, reaching its maximum at some intermediate level. The market-structure e¤ect plays a balancing role: there will be more …rms when the expected return from R&D investment is higher, which moderates the e¤ects of patentability standards on R&D intensities both for each …rm and for the industry.
We further compare the market equilibrium with the solutions that maximize social welfare. First, in relation to the …rst-best innovation rate, we show that R&D intensities and the number of entrants in the free entry equilibrium are de…cient. This is due to the familiar intuition that a …rm's private innovation incentive does not internalize the positive externalities to consumers. 4 Second, compared to the …rst-best innovation direction, we …nd that there exists a critical value of patentability standard,Ŝ; such that the equilibrium R&D direction coincides with the …rst best when S =Ŝ; and it is biased towards (against) the risky direction when S is below (above)Ŝ. 5 For the second-best social welfare maximization problem, in which a hypothetical social planner can only set the patentability standard but not the R&D and entry activities of …rms, the optimal S balances the three goals of moving towards the socially optimal innovation rate, towards the socially optimal innovation direction, and towards the socially optimal market structure. Thus, in general, the second best patentability standard will be di¤erent fromŜ; from the S that maximizes the number of innovating …rms, and from the S that maximizes the rate of innovation either for an individual …rm or for the industry.
Our paper is related to the existing theoretical literature on patents and cumulative innovation, which has studied models with R&D along a single direction and o¤ered mixed …ndings on the e¤ects of patent protection. For example, O'Donoghue (1998) and O'Donoghue et al. (1998) suggest that stronger patent protection has positive e¤ects on the rate of innovation, provided that ex-ante agreement or contracting between innovators is e¢cient, whereas Bessen and Maskin (2009) and Segal and Whinston (2007) …nd cases where the e¤ects are negative. Horowitz and Lai (1996) consider a model in which longer patents increase the size but decrease the frequency of the innovation. They show that the patent length that maximizes the rate of innovation is …nite (or intermediate). 6 As we mentioned earlier, our model is most closely related to Hunt (2004) , who studies patentability and period, but the consumer gain is realized once the next innovation replaces the current one so that the new price only re ‡ects the new quality improvement. Thus consumers bene…t from a patentable innovoation not immediately but dynamically. Notice that, under competition, there is also a business-stealing e¤ect that potentially results in excessive R&D and entry. In our model, as in Hunt (2004) , the positive externality dominates. 5 Intuitively, when S is low, innovations in the risky direction are patentable even when the quality improvement is small, which motives socially excessive R&D in the risky direction, relative to the safe direction: And the opposite is true when S is high. Since we measure innovation or R&D direction by the ratio of R&D intensities in the two directions, R&D can be e¢cient in both directions and yet biased towards one direction. 6 Chen et al. (2014) …nd that stronger patent protection can a¤ect cumulative innovation either positively or negatively, and the e¤ect is generally non-monotonic. Empirically, some recent studies on cumulative innovation (Murray et al., 2007; Furman and Stern, 2011; Galasso and Schankerman, 2013; Williams, 2013; Sampat and Williams, 2014) …nd no evidence of a relationship.
cumulative innovation in a model with R&D only in one direction that corresponds to the risky direction in our paper. By allowing multiple R&D directions, we introduce the important strategic substitution e¤ect and o¤er several new insights. In particular, in contrast to the result in Hunt that the patentability standard a¤ects innovation only through a market structure e¤ect, with no impact on each innovating …rm's R&D intensity, we show that it also a¤ects innovation through its impact on R&D intensities, in ways that are non-monotonic and somewhat unexpected. Thus, in our model, patentability standards a¤ect industry innovation through both the extensive margin (number of entrants) and the intensive margin (R&D intensities). Moreover, our results on innovation (or R&D) direction are novel in this literature.
Our paper is also related to a large literature, broadly de…ned as on R&D portfolio and the direction of innovation. Earlier studies have focused on the issue of how competition may a¤ect the choice between safe and risky research projects for a stand-alone innovation. 7 Some authors have found, under the assumption of winner-take-all, that competition leads to over-investment in risky R&D projects because it magni…es the negative externality of investment by one …rm on other …rms' probability to win the patent. 8 Others, however, have argued that investment in risky R&D project decreases with the strength of competition, because the negative externality of the risky R&D becomes small when competition strengthens, if each …rm pursues multiple patents (Cabral, 1994; Kwon, 2010) . 9 Recent studies have examined sequential innovation. Acemoglu (2011) considers a model with sequential innovation and multiple research paths but only one research path is commercially 7 Acemoglu (2002) argues that pro…t incentives may shape the direction of technical change and therefore determine the equilibrium bias of technology. 8 In a classic paper, Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) show that in R&D races …rms select a too high expected rate of technological changes which, in most cases, induces excessively risky research projects (see also Bhattacharya and Mookherjee, 1986; Klette and de Meza, 1986). 9 Relatedly, Anderson and Cabral (2007) study a game where …rms choose the variance of a stochastic innovation outcome. They …nd that the level of equilibrium variance may be greater, smaller, or equal to the social optimum. Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein (2008) provide a framework for evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of academic research as opposed to private-sector research and show that it is possible for ideas to be privatized sooner than is socially optimal. Choi and Gerlach (2014) study the R&D choice between easy and di¢cult projects that are complementary for the production of a …nal product. They …nd that …rms tend to invest excessively on the easy innovation due to hold-up problems. active at any point in time. He shows that the possibility of changing preferences can induce ine¢ciency because the returns from innovation are only realized for those generations where the research line is commercially active. More recently, Hopenhayn and Squintani (2016) investigate the incentive to innovate among multiple directions in a growth model, …nding that the equilibrium allocation of researchers across R&D lines is suboptimal, with too many pursuing "hot" R&D lines. Bryan and Lemus (2016) consider a directional model where …rms both race toward easy projects and do not fully appropriate the value of their inventions. 10 In the rest of the paper, we describe our model and its equilibrium in Section 2. In Section 3, we establish our results on how the patentability standard a¤ects the rates of innovation, as measured by the R&D intensities of each …rm in the two directions and by the overall R&D intensity of the industry, and how it a¤ects the direction of innovation, as measured by the ratio of the innovation rates in the two directions. We also discuss to what extent each of the main features of our model-particularly multi-periods, uncertainty, multiple research direction, and reward sizes-is responsible for these e¤ects. Section 4 contains our welfare results, comparing the equilibrium rate and direction of innovation with the social optimum, and discussing optimal patentability policy as the second best. In Section 5, we discuss how our …ndings might be a¤ected if we relax the assumption that incumbents do not engage in R&D or if patentability standards are state-dependent. Section 6 concludes.
Our main results are illustrated through a numerical example in Appendix A, and proofs that are more technical in nature are relegated to Appendix B. Technical details analyzing the extension with incumbent innovation are contained in Appendix C.
The Model
Time is continuous and is divided into periods, t = 0; 1; 2; :::; between stochastic discoveries by innovating …rms. There are n+1 …rms in the industry, one of whom is the incumbent and the others are challengers in each period. At period t; the incumbent, through a patented innovation at an earlier period, can produce a product that has quality q t . Each of the challengers conducts R&D to further improve the product quality.
There are two possible research directions for the challengers, direction A-the safe direction, and direction B-the risky direction. A successful innovation through direction A will result in a certain quality improvement, A : 11 A successful innovation through direction B will yield an uncertain quality improvement, B , which is a random variable with cumulative distribution function G ( ) and continuous density g ( ) on support 0; B : As we pointed out before, this formulation closely follows Hunt (2004) , with the main di¤erence being that he considers R&D only along a single uncertain direction corresponding to B
here:
A challenger decides on a R&D portfolio by choosing the R&D intensity in each of the two directions. We assume that each innovation occurs according to a Poisson process. The cost for a challenger to maintain an arrival rate z in research direction z 2 fA; Bg is C ( z ) ; 12 which is strictly increasing and twice continuously di¤erentiable, with C (0) = C 0 (0) = 0, C 00 ( ) > 0; and lim z !1 C 0 ( z ) = 1. 13 We shall also refer to z as the R&D intensity in direction z: 1 1 We can allow A to be stochastic, provided that its variance is su¢ciently small. 1 2 Our formulation implicitly assumes that a …rm's total R&D costs are C ( A) + C ( B ) ; separable across directions. We thus consider situations where R&D inputs are not substitutable between the two innovation directions, possibly because-for instance-they require researchers who specialize in di¤erent technologies. This is a restrictive assumption. It would be more realistic to allow the substition of R&D inputs between alternative research directions, but the analysis could be much more complicated. We leave this for possible future research. 1 3 We follow Lee and Wilde (1980) in assuming that innovation is produced through ‡ow costs, which, as they point out, may generate additional innovation as …rms enter, relative to the case where …xed costs are required for innovation (Loury, 1979) . Notice that we allow the "corner" case where each …rm chooses to conduct R&D only in one direction. Under our assumptions on the cost function, however, the equilibrium will be interior.
The statutory life of a patent is assumed to be in…nite, even though the patent life e¤ectively ends when the next patentable invention occurs. To be awarded a patent, the quality improvement from an invention needs to meet a minimum improvement size, or the patentability standard, S: In practice, the patentability standard (or requirement) can correspond to the requirement of non-obviousness in the American patent code, or of the inventive step in Europe. For the purpose of this paper, we assume that S 2 0; B and S < A : Thus, an innovation achieved through the safe direction is always patentable, whereas (S) 1 G (S) is the probability that an innovation in the risky direction is granted a patent. When an innovation is not protected by a patent, it becomes freely available to the public, in which case we assume that competition drives the pro…t from marketing the product to zero. Notice that the more stringent the patentability requirement, other things equal, the smaller the probability that the challenger can pro…tably market her innovation achieved through the risky direction.
We assume that at the beginning of period t = 0; there is a large number of …rms, each deciding whether to pay a one-time …xed investment cost k to enter the market. Thus, the number of challengers, n; is endogenously determined by the free-entry condition. If a challenger wins the race for a patentable innovation, it becomes the incumbent in the next period, and the previous incumbent becomes a challenger. If a challenger succeeds in an innovation that does not meet the patentability standard, then the incumbent maintains its leader position, and all n + 1 …rms enter into a new period of patent race. The innovation arrival rates and the costs to achieve them remain the same after any discovery, whether patentable or not. Therefore, in either case, the relative positions of the n + 1 …rms in the market are the same, and hence the choice problem for any …rm in the market is stationary.
We denote the discount rate, common for all …rms, by r:
The market contains a representative consumer, who demands one unit of the product per period. The consumer's valuation for a product is equal to its quality. The marginal cost of production for any …rm is normalized to zero. The incumbent and the challengers engage in price competition. Thus, when the incumbent's product quality exceeds the next closest quality by ; its ‡ow pro…t is exactly until the arrival of a new patentable innovation.
The challengers earn no ‡ow pro…t.
As in Hunt (2004) and other studies in this literature, we shall focus on an equilibrium where only challengers, but not the incumbent, will invest in R&D. Incumbents tend to have lower incentive to invest in R&D than entrants due to their existing pro…t. The assumption that they make no investment is more extreme, and it is made mainly for analytical tractability. [We discuss in Section 5 how our analysis could be extended to a setting where incumbents also engage in R&D.] Notice that in our model, players rotate their roles as the incumbent and the challengers over time, so a …rm may only temporarily stop investing. In our analysis that follows, by construction, the strategies by the challengers and the incumbent will constitute a stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). 14 We shall maintain the following assumption throughout the paper:
because of two considerations: First, we wish to ensure that a positive number of …rms will be willing to enter the market to pursue innovation in each direction, which will require 0 < rk < A : Second, we are interested especially in situations where a successful innovation in the risky direction yields a higher expected quality improvement, which is captured by
in order to isolate the e¤ect of uncertainty:
If a challenger innovates through the safe direction, she becomes an incumbent and receives a pro…t ‡ow of
until she is replaced by a future challenger. If the challenger succeeds in the risky direction;
the expected pro…t ‡ow (conditional on the innovation being patentable) is
Notice that
This, together with (1) and assumption (A1), implies that B A > rk > 0. Thus, entry to pursue innovation in each direction can be pro…table. The equilibrium number of entrants in the market will be determined simultaneously as the arrival rate of innovation in each direction, as we show next.
Because all challengers are symmetric, we focus on stationary equilibria where they choose identical R&D strategies. Speci…cally, at such a stationary MPE, which is assumed to exist uniquely, let V I z be the value of being an incumbent through type-z innovation and V E the value of being a challenger, all of which are evaluated at the beginning of a period.
Then V I A ; V I B and V E satisfy the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations 15 :
and
Equations (3), (4) and (5) suggest that the value of being an incumbent depends on the type of innovation that has led to the incumbency. 16 From (5), the challenger chooses optimal A and B ; which respectively satisfy the …rst-order conditions: 17
The free entry condition implies
From (3), (6) and (8), we …nd
Similarly, from (4), (7) and (8), we have
Substituting (9) and (10) into (5) yields 1 6 Note that the size of quality improvement appears with the corresponding probability, even though the incumbent knows its exact value after innovation is successful. Hence B is shown in the right hand of (4). We note again that in general there may be other equilibria, possibly with asymmetric R&D by entrants. We focus on the speci…c equillibrium by assumption. 1 7 The properties of the cost functions ensure that the second-order conditions are satis…ed.
The system of equations, (9) , (10) and (11), determine the three equilibrium values A , B and n . In particular, from (9) and (10), the equilibrium number of challengers can be expressed as
We illustrate the equilibrium of the model with an example in Appendix A.
The Rates and Direction of Innovation
We are now in a position to examine how the patentability standard, S; may a¤ect the rates and direction of innovation. We …rst consider the e¤ects of S on the equilibrium R&D intensities, A and B , which can be viewed as each entrant's innovation rates in the safe and risky directions; respectively. Recall that A , B and n are determined by (9), (10) and (11) . In the appendix, we show the following by using the Cramer's rule:
where 
as the innovation direction.
Proposition 1 As S increases, B …rst increases and then decreases, whereas A …rst decreases and then increases, reaching the maximum and the minimum, respectively, at S = rk. Moreover, innovation direction d (S) has an inverted-U shape, maximized at S = rk.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Interestingly, R&D intensities in both directions vary non-monotonically with S, in contrast to the result in Hunt (2004) that R&D intensity is invariant with the patentability standard. As we discussed in the introduction, a marginal increase in S has both a threshold and an incumbency-prolonging e¤ect: it reduces the probability of obtaining a patent in the risky direction but increases the value of being an incumbent; the former can be attributed to the uncertain size of risky innovations, while the latter is due to the multi-periods feature of our model. The initial increase of B in S is driven by the incumbency-prolonging and strategic substitution e¤ects, which outweigh the threshold e¤ect, whereas the latter e¤ect dominates so that B decrease in S when S > rk: Another crucial force is the strategic substitution e¤ect due to the presence of two research directions: When the R&D intensity in one direction becomes lower (higher), it positively (negatively) impacts the R&D intensity in the other direction due to (the reverse of) the incumbency-prolonging e¤ect. The interactions of these three e¤ects are subtle, and together they jointly determine how B and A vary with S: 18 Thus, in the free entry equilibrium of our model, patentability standards impact industry R&D not only through the number of …rms (the extensive margin), but also through changes in the R&D intensities in di¤erent directions (the intensive margin). Notice that in (14) , if A = 0, then B would be independent of S; and our results would coincide with Hunt's. 19 In our model, innovation direction, d (S) ; is measured by each challenger's R&D intensity in the risky direction relative to that in the safe direction, which determines the relative rates of innovation achieved through the two directions. The inverted-U shaped d (S) ; with its maximum attained at S = rk; follows directly from the shapes of B (S) and A (S) :
Since the expected size of each innovation is weakly higher in the risky direction than in safe direction, one might think that it would be desirable to choose S = rk: However, the overall expected innovation rate of each challenger,
depends also on how di¤erent B (S) and A (S) are. Hence, may not be maximized at rk:
For the industry innovation rate, we need to further consider the number of entrants in equilibrium (n ), which is also a function of S: The equilibrium overall innovation rate of the industry can be de…ned as:
R n :
The result below indicates that the shape of R R (S) is consistent with that of d (S).
Proposition 2 As S rises, R initially increases and eventually decreases; reaching its maximum when S is at some intermediate level.
As in Hunt (2004) , the industry rate of innovation (R) is maximized when the patentability standard is neither too high nor too low. However, the channels through which S a¤ects R di¤er in the two models. In Hunt, as S increases, the equilibrium number of …rms to conduct R&D in the market …rst increases and then decreases, whereas the equilibrium R&D intensity remains unchanged. Our model entails a second channel: the changes in the R&D the level of its quality multiplied by p, and we assume p = 1.
intensities, since @R @S = n @ @S + @n @S ;
and in our model, A and B -and hence also -in general vary with S.
De…ne S R as the patentability requirement that maximizes the innovation rate of the industry R = R (S):
S R = arg max fR (S)g :
In Appendix B, we show that @R @S j S=rk > 0;
which immediately leads to:
Remark 1 If R is a single-peaked function of S; then S R > rk:
Therefore, the patentability standard that maximizes the overall rate of innovation in the industry is higher than S = rk; which maximizes B ; provided that R (S) is single-peaked. 20 Results in this section and the next section will be illustrated in Example 1 of Appendix A.
E¢cient Innovation Incentive and Optimal S
In this section, we compare the equilibrium and the e¢cient incentives for cumulative innovation, where "e¢cient" means welfare-maximizing or the …rst-best; and we study how to choose S optimally at the market equilibrium. Speci…cally, we seek to answer two questions. First, if one could directly choose the number of entrants and the R&D intensities to maximize social welfare (i.e., the …rst best), what would be these choices and how would they di¤er from those in the market equilibrium? Second, if policy can choose patentability 2 0 The single-peak condition on R is needed in Remark 1, because Proposition 2 does not rule out the possibility that R has multiple peaks as S increases on [0; A). Notice also that we assume S < A: If S were to be higher than A; then no innovation would happen in direction A and the result in Hunt (2004) would directly imply SR > rk. standards, but not …rms' innovative activities, what should be the optimal S (i.e., the second best)? Subsection 4.1 addresses the two questions in terms of the values for A ; B ; and n; while subsection 4.2 considers the questions from the perspective of innovation directions.
Comparing R&D Intensities and the Number of Entrants
When there are n challengers, each choosing R&D intensities A and B in safe and risky directions; respectively, total welfare is
where A r and E[ B ] r are the expected social values of innovations generated by one innovating …rm through the safe and risky directions; respectively. 21 The expression inside the square brackets in (18) is thus the instantaneous social bene…t from one innovating …rm, and there are n independent innovating …rms for the industry, multiplied by 1 r to account for the discounted sum of the instantaneous bene…ts.
At the …rst best where a hypothetical social planner directly chooses A ; B and n to maximize W; the welfare-maximizing o A and o B satisfy the following …rst-order conditions:
Notice that the e¢cient R&D intensities equate their marginal social bene…ts and costs.
Comparing (19) to (9) and (10) and noticing that
we …nd that the e¢cient R&D intensities are higher than those in the free entry equilibrium: 2 1 Our model is one of quality ladders, where the bene…t of a quality improvement to the society lasts forever. Thus, the expected social value of an innovation through the safe direction (discounted to the moment of its discovery) is R 1 0 e rt Adt = A r : Similarly, the expected social value of an innovation through the risky direction is
Intuitively, the quality improvement from an innovation bene…ts the society permanently, but the innovating …rm can capture the rents only before it is replaced by the next innovation. Moreover, some quality improvements along direction B are not patentable, which further lowers a …rm's innovation incentive below the e¢cient level.
Moreover, since z C 0 z ( z ) C ( z ) increases in z and o z > z for z = A; B; utilizing (19) and (11), we have
Hence, as in Hunt (2004), the e¢cient number of …rms is n o = 1 > n .
Summarizing the discussions above, we have:
Proposition 3 Compared to the …rst-best, R&D intensities and the number of entrants are de…cient under the free entry equilibrium.
We note two related points. First, the result that aggregate R&D intensity is higher under the social optimum than under the market equilibrium does not rely on the number of …rms at the …rst-best being in…nite. Second, the key to the result of de…cient entry is that the expected social bene…t of adding one more …rm exceeds the sum of its entry and R&D costs. Our analysis has not considered other mechanisms, such as increasing-rather than constant-marginal cost of production, that can also lead to de…cient entry.
When policy can choose the patentability standard whereas …rms choose R&D intensities under free entry to maximize their private bene…ts, the optimal choice of S is also called the second-best problem. Let W (S) be the welfare in equilibrium at the second best: Then, from (18),
The optimal patentability standard, denoted by S ; coincides with the one that maximizes the number of entrants in Hunt (2004) if A 0: To see this, notice that if A 0, our model reduces to that in Hunt (2004) , implying @ A @S = 0; and by (14) @ B @S = 0: Hence, @W (S) @S = 0 implies @n @S = 0. However, in our model
is generally not zero when @n @S = 0; and thus the optimal patentability standard generally di¤ers from the one that maximizes n .
From Remark 1, the S that maximizes the industry innovation rate (R) exceeds rk;
provided that R is a single-peaked function of S: If W is a single-peaked function of S; then S also exceeds rk: To see this, note that, from (9), (10) and (20),
Thus, noticing
@S j S=rk = 0 and @n @S j S=rk > 0, we have
where the equality follows from (11).
Summarizing the above discussion, we have:
Remark 2 As a second-best, the patentability standard that maximizes W W (S) ; S ;
generally does not maximize the number of …rms in the industry. Furthermore, if W (S) is single-peaked, then S > rk:
Therefore, even though the expected quality improvement from an innovation can be higher in the risky direction than in the safe direction, under the single-peak condition, the welfare-maximizing S does not maximize innovation in the risky direction: This is because by raising S above rk; industry innovation can be increased.
Notice that for S to be a valid solution to the maximization problem for W (S) ; we have implicitly assumed that S A : If this constraint is binding, then we would have S = A : This is because if S > A ; then no entrant would conduct R&D in the safe direction so that A = 0 and the problem is the same as if the risky direction were the only research direction: But since C 0 A (0) = 0 by assumption, it is socially desirable to have strictly positive R&D investment in the safe direction: This implies that W (S) would jump down at S = A : Therefore, it is likely that S A even if we allow S to be larger than A :
Comparing the Innovation Directions
We now compare the equilibrium innovation direction d (S) with the innovation direction that maximizes social welfare, d o : From (19), we have
Hence, at the welfare-maximizing innovation direction, the ratio of the marginal costs equals the ratio of the marginal bene…ts of innovations in the two directions.
Recall from Proposition 1 that the equilibrium innovation direction d (S) is maximized at S = rk: The result below states that …rms are biased towards (against) innovation in the risky direction when S is below (above) some threshold. A sketch of the proof is as follows:
with a bias towards direction B: As S increases but is smaller than rk, innovation is even more biased towards direction B because, from Proposition 1, B = A increases in S if S < rk: As S further increases and surpasses rk; B starts to decrease and A to increase, and thus d (S) becomes smaller but can still be larger than d o :
When S >Ŝ; the threshold value of S; d (S) falls below d o and monotonically decreases, so that innovation direction is biased towards direction A: Formally:
Proof. From (19) , under the social optimum,
From (9) and (10), given S; in the free-entry equilibrium
Thus,
As S increases,
…rst increases and then decreases, reaching its maximum at S = rk; because determined by
Moreover, since To understand this result, note that the innovation direction that maximizes social welfare, d o ; is invariant with patentability standard because all (patentable and unpatentable) innovations will increase social bene…ts. However, market incentives do change as patentability standard varies. Speci…cally, when the patentability standard is relatively low, the risky research direction with uncertain innovation size is likely to yield a patent even when the quality improvement is small, increasing the innovation incentive through that direction. Reinforced by the incumbency-prolonging and strategic substitution e¤ect, this motivates …rms to conduct R&D in the risky direction excessively relative to the direction with a certain innovation size. Conversely, when the patentability standard is high enough, the direction with uncertain innovation size is unlikely to receive a patent even when the quality improvement is relatively large, which unduly discourages R&D in that direction.
Notice that whileŜ leads to the e¢cient choice of research direction, it need not be the welfare-maximizing S for W (S) in the second-best problem. This is because S also a¤ects W (S) through n (S) ; as can be seen from (22) , and thusŜ need not maximize W (S) :
Intuitively, the second-best choice of S; S ; will generally involve a trade o¤ between two policy goals: moving towards the e¢cient R&D direction (d o ) and towards the e¢cient number of entrants (n o ). When S achieves the e¢cient R&D direction, asŜ does, it does not optimally balance the two goals, and hence in generalŜ does not maximize W (S) (i.e. S 6 = S ).
Discussion
For tractability, our model has made the restrictive assumptions that the incumbent does not conduct R&D and that the patentability standard is exogenously given and …xed. In this section, we discuss how our analysis might change if these assumptions are relaxed.
In subsection 5.1, we illustrate, in a particular setting and with an example, that the main insights of our model can still be valid when incumbents also conduct R&D. Subsection 
When Incumbents Also Conduct R&D
We have shown how patentability standards impact innovation through the threshold, incumbency-prolonging, strategic substitution and market-structure e¤ects in a model where each incumbent (the leader) is assumed not to innovate. The analysis for the situation where the incumbent also conducts R&D is generally very complicated. This is because the incumbent may invest di¤erent amounts of R&D after its successful innovation each time, and if the incumbent keeps (luckily) succeeding there are in…nitely many states and R&D strategies for the incumbent. In this case, there is no stationary equilibrium.
To get a ‡avor of the analysis when incumbents can innovate, suppose that each incum-bent can conduct R&D in all periods of its incumbency and pro…t from all of its patented technologies in a cumulative sense, until it is replaced by a challenger whose R&D starts from the current state of technology. Then, an in…nite number of equations are needed to describe the dynamic system in equilibrium, starting from
where V I z , z 2 fA; Bg is, as before, the expected value of being an incumbent through type-z innovation. These expected values depend on the incumbent's further innovation. Hence:
where V I z 1 z denotes the expected value of maintaining the leader position through type-z 1 innovation for the incumbent who currently has a type-z technology, with z 1 and z 2 fA; Bg.
But the values of V I z 1 z depend on the incumbent's further innovation, as described by (AC-1) in Appendix C, where V I z 2 z 1 z is the expected value of maintaining the leader position through type-z 2 innovation for the incumbent who currently has a type-z 1 and a type-z technology, for z 2 ; z 1 ; and z 2 fA; Bg. This process can potentially continue inde…nitely.
To gain insights on how the e¤ects might change when incumbents are allowed to innovate in a setting that is still tractable, we next consider the case where the incumbent conducts R&D until it succeeds at most one more time (i.e. it can succeed at most two consecutive periods before stopping R&D). Then, all values of V I z 2 z 1 z in (AC-1) are zero. In this case, the quality size by which the incumbent leads is z + z 1 .
From (23)-(25), we can obtain the …rst-order conditions on A ; B ; AA ; AB ; BA ; and BB ; as in (AC-2) of Appendix C: Substituting these conditions back into (23)- (25) and
(AC-1), and using the free-entry condition V E = k, we obtain a system of seven equations, as in (AC-3) of Appendix C, which determines the seven equilibrium values A , B , AA , BA , AB , BB and n : Appendix C also contains the expressions for industry innovation direction d(S); industry innovation rate R, and total welfare W:
While we are unable to obtain analytical solutions to the system of equations in (AC-3),
we can numerically compute the equilibrium. patterns that are broadly consistent with those in Figure 1 , especially at the industry level.
Thus, our main results on how patentability standards impact innovation can be valid when incumbents are allowed to engage in R&D as well. This is not entirely surprising because, intuitively, the incumbent itself can be viewed as a new challenger, whose participation in the patent race need not change the basic forces at work.
One notable di¤erence in Figure 2 is that as S increases, A (S) barely decreases initially before increasing, and B (S) barely increases initially before decreasing, while the other key relationships appear to have much more similar shapes as those in Figure 1 . Thus, allowing incumbents to also conduct R&D appears to make (initial) increases in S more negatively impact innovation in the risky direction and more positively impact innovation in the safe direction. Recall that when incumbents are assumed to conduct no R&D, the incumbency-prolonging e¤ect plays a key role in leading to the initial decrease of A (S) and initial increase of B (S). When incumbents can also innovate, a reduction of R&D by new entrants has less impact on the duration of the incumbency, which weakens the incumbency-prolonging e¤ect. This, together with the interaction with the threshold and strategic substitution e¤ects, appears to be responsible for the main di¤erence between the two …gures. 22 
State-Dependent Patentability Standards
Our model has assumed that the patentability standard is exogenously given and …xed.
It would also be interesting to examine the situation where the patentability standardthe quality improvement required to be granted a patent-is endogenously determined and depends on the current technology state of the industry. 23 One major di¢culty, however, is that …rms' R&D strategies will no longer be stationary under state-dependent patentability standards, which makes it a formidable task to analyze the problem generally.
To illustrate some possible new insights and implications, we consider a particular statedependent patentability policy under which the current patentability standard is set as high as the one in the patent that was previously granted (Amano, 2016) . Speci…cally, the statedependent patentability policy de…nes a patentability standard in the risky direction, S t ; at time t as
where D B (t) is the size of the most recent innovation (at time t) that has been granted a patent. Note that in our main model with …xed patentability, S t is invariant over time.
Our …rst-and obvious-observation is that under the state-dependent patentability policy, the patentability standard will gradually increase over time.
We next compare innovation incentives under the …xed and state-dependent patentability policies. In particular, we consider the question: at any moment t; if innovating …rms face the same patentability standard under the two policies, which policy will induce higher R&D 2 2 Our speci…c formulation of the incumbent innovation assumes that an incumbent increases its quality lead additively when it has multiple innovations. Suppose instead that when an incumbent succeeds in a new innovation, its earlier lead is partially replaced, possibly due to leakages of its earlier technology. Then, the usual replacement e¤ect will become more pronounced, reducing the incentives of incumbent innovation. Consequently, the incumbency-prolonging e¤ect-and our results-would be less a¤ected if incumbents are allowed to conduct R&D. 2 3 Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) take into account state-dependent patent length in a framework of stepby-step innovation.
investment?
As in our main model, the innovation incentives here are mainly determined by the threshold, incumbency-prolonging, and strategic substitution e¤ects. Under the same patentability standard, a …rm faces the same di¢culty in obtaining a patent from innovation (the threshold e¤ect). However, the incumbency-prolonging e¤ect is stronger under the statedependent patentability policy because an innovating …rm expects a higher future patentability standard after its successful patentable innovation and thus a longer incumbency. Hence, the R&D intensity is higher in the risky direction under state-dependent patentability policy due to a stronger incumbency-prolonging e¤ect. Moreover, the R&D incentive is lower in the safe direction because a higher R&D intensity in one direction reduces the innovation incentive of the other direction (the strategic substitution e¤ect). We thus have the following remark.
Remark 3 Given a patentability standard S t ; …rms have higher (lower) incentives to invest in the risky (safe) direction under the state-dependent patentability policy than under the …xed patentability policy.
We may also ask how equilibrium R&D intensities in di¤erent directions and industry innovation change with the endogenously determined patent policy over time. Recall that in our model with a …xed patentability standard, R&D intensities in the risky and safe directions are time-invariant but-from Proposition 1-as S rises, R&D intensity in the risky (safe) direction …rst increases (decreases) and then decreases (increases). Moreover, from Proposition 2, as S rises, innovation innovation initially increases and eventually decreases.
Since the patentability standard increases over time under the state-dependent patentability policy, Propositions 1 and 2 imply the following:
Remark 4 Under the state-dependent patentability policy, it is possible that, over time, R&D intensity in the risky (safe) direction …rst increases (decreases) and eventually decreases (increases). Moreover, industry innovation will initially increase but eventually de-crease.
CONCLUSION
This paper has provided a …rst look at how patent policy may impact the rate and direction of cumulative innovation when …rms can conduct R&D in multiple directions. We have three main …ndings: (i) Patentability standards a¤ect the rate of industry innovation through both the number of entrants and their R&D intensities in the free entry equilibrium. As
S rises, the rate of industry innovation initially increases and eventually decreases. (ii)
Compared to the social optimum, market incentives for cumulative innovation are de…cient for both R&D intensities and the number of entrants. (iii) There exists a critical level of patentability standard (Ŝ) under which the innovation direction is e¢cient, whereas R&D is biased towards (against) the risky direction when S is below (above)Ŝ: However, if S is the only policy variable available, then the optimal policy, which balances the trade-o¤ between the rate and direction of innovation, will in general be di¤erent fromŜ:
Discussions about patent policy and the patent system have frequently surrounded the issue of patentability standards. It has been argued that patentability standards in the U.S. are too low, leading to excessive incentives for small-size innovations (e.g., Hunt, 2004; Ja¤e, 2000) . Our results suggest that raising patentability standards may indeed improve innovation direction, with two caveats: …rst, the e¤ect of a higher S on innovation direction may be non-monotonic, and a small increase in S can either alleviate or exacerbate possible direction biases depending on the starting point; second, in our model, the risky direction may lead to more small-size innovations but to a higher expected size than the safe direction.
Hence, even when raising S reduces the patenting of small-size innovations, it may not raise the expected innovation size.
In our model, the …xed setup cost for R&D (adjusted by r), rk; plays important roles in determining the innovation incentives and the optimal patentability standards. This cost generally di¤ers for di¤erent industries. For instance, it is likely much larger in the pharmaceutical industry than in the software industry. Thus, it would be desirable that patentability standards di¤er for di¤erent industries, depending (indirectly) on the setup cost for R&D projects. Moreover, innovations in developing countries tend to be much below the world technology frontier and require lower setup cost rk than those in developed countries. Then, the desirable patentability requirement could be lower in developing countries in order to promote innovation. 24 is not equal to S n = 0:24, and is greater than rk = 0:096. Then, as a second-best, the patentability standard that maximizes W (S) does not maximize the number of …rms in the industry, and is greater than the patentability standard that minimizes A (S) and maximizes B (S) and d(S). This illustrates Remarks 2.
(e). Notice that we obtainŜ e = 0:4664, greater than rk = 0:096 and A , such thatŜ e is a corner solution to Proposition 4, as S 2 [0; 0:3) in this example.
Figure 1: Example 1
We next compute the relevant derivatives:
It follows that where
From (13), (14) and (AB-1), we can show that, after substitution and simpli…cation, Note that E[ B ] A since 1: If S = 0; then S < min f A ; B ; rkg : It follows that @R @S j S=0 > 0: If S = B ; then S max f A ; B ; rkg and we have @R @S j S= B < 0.
Proof of (17) . From (AB-2),
That is (17). (AC-4) where 1 n ( A + B ) is the expected incumbency, n z is the R&D intensity in direction z 2 fA; Bg for the n challengers per period, is the R&D intensity in direction z 0 2 fA; Bg for the incumbent who currently holds a type-z patented technology with z 2 fA; Bg.
Similar to the above reasoning, the overall innovation rate of the industry, R, and total welfare, W , can be respectively determined as follows: 2 6 If the incumbent currently holds a type-A patented technology, 1 n ( A + B ) is the expected incumbency, and 1 AA + BA is the expected duration for the incumbent to conduct R&D until it successfully innovates a patented technology. The incumbent will conduct R&D until it is replaced by a challenger or successfully innovates a patented technology. So the e¤ective time for the incumbent to conduct R&D is the smaller of 
